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MORTGAGES
THE PROBLEM OF SUBROGATION-FULL STANDING AS A
CREDITOR OR INDEMNITY

T

HE extent of the right to which one becomes subrogated, that
being his intention, upon discharge of an obligation for
another is a matter which has caused Texas courts some difficulty.
The question in each case is whether the payor is subrogated to
the full rights of the creditor, which often include interest and
attorney's fees if suit is necessary, or whether he is merely entitled
to indemnity. Often this decision is very important to the parties
for the additional reason that it will determine which statute of
limitations will run against the claim for subrogation. Full stand.
ing as a creditor carries with it four years' in which to enforce
such rights; whereas, if the claimant is held entitled to indemnity
alone, the statutory period is two years.2
The question was considered in Buchanan v. Buchanan' where
plaintiff asserted a claim against the estate of a debtor whose debt
in the principal sum had been evidenced by the usual promisory
note but secured by a chattel mortgage upon plaintiff's automobile.
To protect her property in the automobile plaintiff had paid to
the creditor the face amount of the note. The court held that plaintiff did not by such payment become legal owner of the note so
as to create between herself and the estate of deceased a contractual relationship for payment of interest and attorney's fees,
but held that plaintiff's claim was, rather, an equitable one, arising
out of an implied promise of deceased to indemnify plaintiff
against loss to her property in the amount she was required to
expend in such protection.
The court relied for precedent upon the case of Faires v. Cock.
I Tx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 5527.
2 Id., art. 5526.
0 205 S. W. (2d) 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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erell,; which established the general rule that subrogation gives
indemnity and no more," or in the words of the court: "Where one
is subrogated to the securities held by the creditor he is not entitled
to recover the rate of interest expressed in the judgment or note
which is the evidence of the debt. The amount of the payment
made with legal interest is the measure of recovery."'
It is important to note that the Faires case concerned joint
obligors on a contract, one of whom had paid, in performance of
the joint obligation, and sought contribution from the other. Under
such a fact situation, an obviously fair and reasonable result was
reached in allowing recovery only on implied promise.
The doctrine of the Faires case did not go unchallenged, however, for the Supreme Court in the case of Fox v. Kroeger7 spe.
cifically criticized the Faires case because of failure to distinguish
between rights of surties and indorsers and joint makers.' The
court inthe Fox case announced the rule to be:
"... that where the surety pays the debt of the principal, he has his
election to either pursue his legal remedies and bring an action on
assumpsit, or the obligation implied by law in his favor for reimburse.
ment by the principal; or he can prosecute an action on the very debt
itself, and in either event he stands in the shoes of the original creditor
as to any securities and rights of priority."9

As a result of the criticism of the Faires case by the Supreme
Court in the Fox case, the Commission of Appeals in 1933 in the
case of Hancheu v. Ward1 spoke of the Faires case as overruled,
and allowed agents of an insurance company, who had remitted
premiums from their own pockets minus commissions, to be subro4 88 Tex. 428,31 S. W. 190 (1895).
s Phipps v. Fuqua, 32 S. W. (2d) 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) writ ol error relwsed. See
also, 39 Trx. Jun. 801.
'88 Tex. 428, 437; 31 S. W. 190, 194 (1895).
T
119 Tex.511, 35 S.W. (2d) 679 (1931).
' Gaines v. Gaines, 119 S. W. (2d) 427, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
' 119 Tex. 511, 517,35 S. W. (2d) 679, 681 (1931).
10 65 S. W. (2d) 268 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
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gated to contract rights of the company upon policies issued to
a policyholder.
Nor was this to be the final word on rights to pass by subrogation, for both lines of authority were followed and applied in the
case of Patterson v. Fuller." It was there held that two or four
sureties on a note, who gave a new note in payment of the old note
acquired against non-paying sureties a right of action, one, upon
implied promise for reimbursement, or two, upon the old note
itself, citing both the Faires and Fox cases, the former upon the
proposition that execution of the second note gave the sureties so
paying a right of action upon implied promise and relying upon
the Fox case to sustain a possible suit upon note one.
It is the opinion of the writer that one seeking subrogation in
Texas courts will receive substantial justice in the event his claim
is valid, but the question as to how bountiful will be his recovery
will depend upon whether that claim is classed as one entitling
him to indemnity or to full standing as a creditor. It is further
submitted that consideration of the problem in the light of the
distinction between payment and purchase will substantially aid in
determining which classification is to apply.
SUBROGATION-EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIEN ON
PAYMENT BY AGENT

The case of Somerville v. Smith12 established an agency principle that affects the rights of one who pays the debt of another
and seeks subrogation to the rights of the creditor. If the third
party who pays is an agent of the debtor, he will be limited to
recovery from that debtor to the amount expended rather than
subrogated to rights of the creditor. This holding, while in accord
with Buchanan v. Buchanan,' supra, reaches this result by application of a different principle.
In the Somerville case, Smith had purchased a refrigerator unit
1 110 S. W. (2d) 1230, 1232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
12 200 S. W. (2d) 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

is 205 S. W. (2d) 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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from Ed Fredrich Sales Corporation, vendor, executing a promissory note and a chattel mortgage. Later defendant Smith got behind in his payments and traded the unit to one Sheeler for another
unit, Sheeler agreeing to assume the balance unpaid against the
first unit. Payment had not yet been made when plaintiff, at the
request of Smith, purchased the old note and took a transfer of it
from the payee along with an assignment of the chattel mortgage.
Neither Smith nor Sheeler paid; so, plaintiff instituted suit against
those two and McGuire, the latter having purchased the unit from
Sheeler. Against McGuire, only foreclosure was sought.
McGuire plead that plaintiff acted as agent for Smith-in
effect, that the plaintiff loaned Smith the money with which to
pay the balance on the note, and the jury found the agency to

exist. As a result, the trial court denied foreclosure against McGuire but allowed recovery against both Smith and Sheeler in the
amount of the unpaid balance plus interest and attorney's fees as
stipulated in the original note made by Smith.
The court sustained the judgment, holding the legal effect of
the transaction, ".... to be that Smith was indebted to plaintiff

for repayment of the moneys so advanced for him. Plaintiff's cause
of action was then not on the note, but for the amount paid out.""'
The Somerville case has several loose ends but these are not the
fault of the appellate court. Defendants Smith and Sheeler did not
complain of the trial court's action in rendering judgment against
them in an amount greater than indemnity. This discrepancy was
pointed out by the appellate court. The opinion did not, however,
discuss Sheeler's liability, his promise, in the nature of a third
party creditor beneficiary contract, having been, in fact, to assume
the unpaid balance on the refrigerator unit, presumably as claimed
by the creditors against Smith rather than a promise to pay Somerville, the plaintiff.
For authority the court cited Corpus Juris Secundum, to the
effect "that where the agent of the maker of a note takes up the
" 200 S. W. (2d) 242, 244 (TeL Civ. App. 1947).
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obligation with funds furnished by the maker, it will generally
operate as a payment of the note"" s
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION V. PARTITION-OWELTY PAYMENTS

In Travelers Insurance Company v. Nauertt s the court handled

the problem of priority between a claim for homestead exemption
and that of a lien claim which arose out of owelty payments in an
equitable partition, and rendered an opinion upholding the lien
claim that can be said to extend the doctrine of Sayers v. Pyland."7
Sayers.v. Pyland held that where an undivided interest in land
is dedicated by occupancy as a homestead, such homestead is held
subject to the right of partition by other co-tenants. The husband
and wife have the power, in effecting an agreed partition thereof,
to subject the land awarded them to an incumbrance to the end
that the land be equitably partitioned.
In the Nauert case, defendant's father devised land, one-half
to his wife and one-fourteenth to each of seven children. The wife,
by will, divided the land into four parts and devised them to four
of the seven children on the condition that they pay certain sums
to the other three children. One child, defendant here, with his
wife, had been occupying land as a homestead. He was given a
partition deed, reserving a lien in accordance with his mother's
will, on execution of notes to secure and evidence his debt in favor
of other children.
After some difficulty,"8 the court held that he and his wife could
encumber the land with a deed of trust securing the notes.
1s 10 C.J. S. 986

(1938).

16 200 S. W. (2d) 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
17 139 Tex. 57, 161 S. W. (2d) 769 (1942).
15 The opinion, appearing in the 200 S. W. (2d) 661, was published in 1947, though
it bears the date, Dec. 4, 1941, Rehearing Denied, April 30, 1942. On April 29, 1942, the
Supreme Court delivered the opinion in the case of Sayers v. Pyland. The court believ.
ing its decision conflicted with that case, set aside the order overruling motion for rehearing on its own motion, and on reconsideration this result was reached. The delay in print.

ing resulted from a belief by the court that the doctrine of the Sayers case was not extended. However, several years later upon request of appellant's attorney, this opinion
was certified to West Publishing Company.
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As a result of this hard found conclusion, the insurance company was adjudged the owner of the land in a trespass to try title
suit, its claim being founded upon sale and foreclosure under the
said deed of trust.
It is believed that this opinion does extend the doctrine of the
Sayers case in that here the homestead had previously attached
to an interest owned absolutely by the mortgagor and it was to
take an additional undivided interest under devise that the mortgagor pledged both his newly acquired interest and his previous
absolute interest to which homestead rights had attached.
ESTOPPEL OF SUCCESSORS TO GRANTOR TO ASSERT SUPERIOR

TITLE TO PURCHASER FROM GRANTEE ON
DEFAULT OF LAND CONTRACT

In Wickwire-Mitchell Royalty Trust v. Taylor the court found
successors to an original vendor who had encouraged his vendee
to sell mineral rights "like you had it paid for; like it was yours,"
estopped from asserting superior title upon reconveyance by the
vendee and a subsequent transfer to said successors.
In this case one McDaniel had conveyed to Barnett, reserving
a vendor's lien. While in possession, Barnett, encouraged by McDaniel to do so, conveyed mineral rights to Reed, from whom
appellants derived title. Prior to the conveyance by Reed to appellants, Barnett reconveyed to McDaniel; however, this conveyance remained unrecorded until after the conveyance from Reed to
appellants. Appellees, plaintiffs in an action Of trespass to try
title, were successors in a chain of transfer from McDaniel; however, in their deed, the title to certain mineral rights was excepted
from the general warranty.
Between the parties to the suit appellants stood in the better
position as far as notice 20 was concerned, their deed being of
record at the time appellees took, and appellees having notice by
exception in their deed.
19 200 S. W. (2d) 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
20 14 TEx. JuR. 970 (1931).
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The court first found that as a result of his acts the grantor,
McDaniel, was estopped to assert superior title to that of Reed,
purchaser of the minerals, or his transferees, the appellants here.
Then the court adopted into Texas law the doctrine stated in
Corpus furis Secudum that "An estoppel of a grantor to assert
title to property extends to his grantee.""
Thus was the court able to reverse and hold for appellants, they
having relied upon the action of the original grantor of all parties.
The court, however, recognized the general rule to be that where
a vendee defaults in the payment of the purchase money, the
vendor may, when it is not inequitable, rescind.
The opinion did not raise the question of constructive notice to
the mineral purchasers by recordation of the land cotract between
McDaniel and Barnett. The words, "Like you had it paid for;
like it was yours" leave a little to be desired as an estoppel situation, as it seems to this writer that there is inherent in such statements, when made in the presence of a prospective purchaser,
notice that he who is being urged to sell does not own. It is submitted that apparent authority would have been a better basis for
this decision.
SUBROGATION-RIGHTS

ACQUIRED UNDER ASSIGNMENT

OF A DEED OF TRUST

The strength of a power of sale in a deed of trust was illustrated
somewhat forcefully in the case of Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Gunter"
where title to a subsequently conveyed undivided interest in oil,
gas, and other minerals was cut off upon failure of the grantor of
said deed of trust to perform conditions therein. This result was

reached even though the note evidencing the debt was cancelled in
an assignment of said deed of trust.
W. L. Gunter owned land on which he executed and delivered
to the trustee of the Federal Land Bank of Houston a deed of trust
-131 C. J. S. 401.
22205 S. W. (2d) 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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to secure payment of a note, and to renew and extend the balance
due on the amortization plan of a certain note previously executed
against the propertyThereafter, he executed and delivered to two purchasers a deed
of an undivided interest in gas, oil, and other minerals. Subsequently, the bank transferred and assigned to one Miss Tompkins
the unpaid balance of said indebtedness and the deed of trust lien
securing payment. The note evidencing the debt was cancelled. In
the transfer and assignment there was included a provision for subrogation to all rights of the bank.
Prior to these assignments, W. L. Gunter executed and delivered
to Miss Tompkins a new deed of trust to secure the payment of the
indebtedness, it being renewed and extended, and conditioned
upon new and different provisions in regard to interest and
payment.
Later, the trustee, reciting default and sale under the original
deed of trust, deeded to Miss Tompkins, vendor to plaintiffs, Loyd
Gunter and others. The latter then brought this suit in trespass to
try title to oust claimants to the minerals under assignment from
the purchasers of W. L. Gunter. They were successful.
The court held that the original lien had not been permitted to
lapse and that the rights of Miss Tompkins had been preserved
by assignment of the debt and lien as well as by the provision for
subrogation in the renewal and extension agreement. Takers under
the mineral deed were held precluded by superior rights that
passed under the deed of trust, duly recorded, and, in brief, by
the fact that their position had not been changed by these transactions, there being no need to advise them personally of foreclosure, they being held to constructive notice of the foreclosure
proceedings.
The court relied for authority, primarily on Corpus Juris,
wherein the general rule is stated to be,
"... that the original mortgage will not be discharged in the absence

of a clear intention to that effect," and that, 'Where a note secured by a
mortgage is taken up, at or before its maturity, and a new note subs.
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tuted for it, the mortgage continues as security for the debt in its new
form ... '28

This case has then reaffirmed Texas to the position that changes
in the form, condition of payment, date of maturity, or interest
rate, or cancellation of the original and substitution of a renewal
note, will not impair the security under a deed of trust, providing
there is no intent to do so.
The case of Willis v. Sanger" had previously committed Texas
to the same approximate position and the opinion there is relied
upon by the court in the Sohio case.
A further implication of the Sohio case in regard to the priority
of claims is found in the court's conclusion that had foreclosure
been under the second deed of trust, the result would have been
the same. It is submitted by the writer that the court was here paying due regard to the subrogation provisions in the assignment
transaction and regarding the execution of the new deed of trust
as a mere paper transaction with no extinguishment of the lien
rights.
Drawing of an analogy for comparison purposes between an
absolute interest purchased and a mortgage interest in land will
result in the Sohio case appearing to give a result contra, but in
reality distinguishable from the case of Herbert v. Denman in
which case it was held that the purchaser at a trustee's sale on foreclosure of a deed of trust taken on renewal of senior vendor's lien
note took title subject to a junior vendor's lien note, this, though renewals were intended to remain first liens.
It is believed that inclusion of the original power of sale is the
point of divergence. In the Sohio case, the purchaser took subject
to the duly recorded deed of trust instrument, which instrument
encompassed power of sale without court action; whereas, in the
Denman case, while the junior lien holder took subject to the
28 41 C. I., Mortgages, 806, 807, 808 (1926).
2415 Tex. Civ. App. 655, 664, 40 S. W. 229,

233 (Tea. Civ. App. 1897) writ of error
refused.
Is 44 S. W. (2d) (Tem. Civ. App. 1931) writ of error refused.
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senior holder and his assigns, he was not subject to an out of
court sale.
This distinction is best illustrated by the two following quotations: "The rule is announced by all the authorities that a junior
encumbrancer who is not made a party to a suit to foreclose a
prior mortgage or lien is not affected by the judgment is such
suit."
"... The foreclosure involved ... is limited to a foreclosure by
suit. It does not apply to a foreclosure by sale made under, and
in compliance with, a valid contract of sale.""7
STATUTES

The Texas Legislature in regular session, the 50th, provided for
registration, and certification of title to house trailers," provided
29
for cancellation of recorded liens on automobiles after six years,
and provided for a speedy, revamped registration of title to used
automobiles, penalizing delay and failure to record.3'
-J. B. H.

26 McDonald v. Miller, 90 Tex. 309,39 S. W. 89,94 (1897).
27 Winchester v. Boggs, 112 S. W. (2d) 207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
2
s Tex. Laws 1947, c. 105, 1 2a., p. 168.
29 Tex. Laws 1947, c. 426, 1 47a., p. 1008.

so TeL Laws, 1947, c. 364, pp. 732, 733, 734.

